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I.

INTRODUCrION

This Article examines the negative impact on sustainable agricultural practices resulting from uncertainty in agricultural land tenure,
focusing on leasing, heirs property, and conservation easements. Each
of these concepts affects land tenure and introduces uncertainty into
the agricultural operation, calling into question the future of the operation and prompting decisions that negatively impact the sustainability of the operation. Uncertainty in land tenure (or "land
tenure insecurity") constitutes a major factor in determining whether

conservation practices will be adopted by the operator) Most of these
* Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law, Lead Land Use
Attorney, Land Use and Sustainable Development Law Clinic. The Author acknowledges the support of West Virginia University College of Law and the Hodges/Bloom
Research Fund.
1. Edward Cox, A Lease-Based Approach to Sustainable Farming, Part : Farm
Tenancy Trends and the Outlook for Sustainability on Rented Land, 15 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 369, 370-71 (2010); FRANK CLEARFIELD & BARBARA T. OSGOOD, SOIL
CONSERVATION SERV., SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE ADOFTION OF CONSERVA-

TION PRACTICES 9 (1986), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/
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concerns have been raised in connection with lease arrangements, but
uncertainty in other types of land tenure may have similar effects.
Leasing implicates the "tenancy hypothesis"-the theory that tenants have little incentive to make long-term investments in the property since the tenant has no stake in the land beyond the term of the
lease.2 The tenancy hypothesis resembles the "impermanence syndrome" in several ways. The impermanence syndrome, generally discussed in connection with agricultural operations on the rural-urban
fringe, refers to an observed reluctance of farm operators to make
investments in the business due to perceived threats.' The perceived
threat generally consists of urban expansion infringing upon farm operations.4 This threat sometimes accompanies a short-term (usually a
year-to-year) lease where the landlord may sell the property when the
urban expansion meets the farmland being rented. In the case of the
impermanence syndrome, both the landlord and the tenant display a
reluctance to make long-term investments in the property for agricultural purposes, feeling that the farm operation is a placeholder waiting
for urban development to replace the activity.
The Author could not locate an instance where the concept of the
tenancy hypothesis or impermanence syndrome has been used in connection with heirs property. However, uncertainty and a lack of control raise similar issues in this context.
"Heirs property" refers to property usually held in a tenancy in
common, often with many owners, where at least some of the owners
have inherited the property.' The nature of tenancy in common and
stelprdblO45620.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9LJ-OTT6]; J. Gordon Arbuckle, Jr. et al.,
Non-Operator Landowner Interest in Agroforestry Practices in Two Missouri Watersheds, 75 AGROFOREST Sys. 73, 74 (2009); Meredith J. Soule et al., Land Tenure and
the Adoption of Conservation Practices, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 993, 993-94, 1003
(2000) [hereinafter Soule et al., Land Tenure]; see also IOWA STATE UNIv. EXTENSION, RENTED LAND IN IOWA: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS 1

(2010),

http://www.soc.iastate.edu/extension/ifrip/PDF/PMR1006.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PKVQ23E] (noting ownership plays a role in the environmental effects of farming);
MICHAEL DUFFY
AND

TENURE

ET AL., IOWA STATE UNIv. EXTENSION,

IN IOWA

FARMLAND OWNERSHIP

2007 18 (rev. 2008), http://www.extension.iastate.edulPublica-

tions/PM1983.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JQG-2BWE] [hereinafter DUFFY ET AL., FARMLAND OWNERSHIP] (discussing length of tenure and the effect on soil conservation);
Michael S. Carolan, Barriers to the Adoption of Sustainable Agriculture on Rented
Land: An Examination of Contesting Social Fields, 70 RURAL Soc. 387, 398 (2005)
(noting there is more incentive for conservation if leases are for multiple growing
seasons); cf Linda K. Lee & William H. Stewart, Landownership and the Adoption of
Minimum Tillage, 65 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 256, 257 (1983) (noting tenure arrangements that separate ownership from operation can hinder conservation).
2. Erik Lichtenberg, Tenants, Landlords, and Soil Conservation, 89 AM. J.
AGRIc. ECON. 294, 294 (2007).
3. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 13:3, at 537 n.24 (3rd ed. 2013).

4. Id.
5. B. James Deaton, A Review and Assessment of the Heirs' Property Issue in the
United States, 46 J. ECON. ISSUES 615, 615-16 (2012).
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the large number of such owners mean that, while all of the owners
have the right to occupy the property, no one owner has control over
the activities on the property.
Researchers assert that heirs property results in the tragedy of the
anti-commons, discussed further in Section IV.C., which results in underutilization of the property, or "waste." 6 Anti-commons property
presents the inverse of the tragedy of the commons, and is "a type of
property regime that may result when initial endowments are created
as disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles of rights in
scarce resources." 7 In contrast, commons property involves multiple
owners, none with a right to exclude others.' Each of the owners possesses an incentive to use as much of the resource as possible, resulting in the "tragedy" of the commons-overuse. 9
Anti-commons property also involves multiple owners. Each owner
has the right to exclude others, but none has an effective right to use
the property.'o The "tragedy" here, however, is underuse." This lack
of control and uncertainty of the future of the property in the heirs
property situation similarly discourages long-term investment in the
property. Further, the owners may be encouraged to extract as many
benefits from the property as possible, without sharing with other coowners.
The final type of land tenure-land burdened by a conservation
easement-seems, at first blush, to be out-of-place in this discussion.
Indeed, no commentator has developed a hypothesis or theory related
to conservation easements that resembles the tenancy hypothesis or
the tragedy of the anti-commons.
In addition, the link between conservation easements and negative
impacts on sustainable agriculture arises from different causes than
those in leasing or heirs property. However, the imposition of a conservation easement implicates land tenure by ceding some control
over land practices from the landowner to a land trust or governmental agency, and by limiting future options of landowners. These circumstances lead to uncertainty, which, in some cases, can impact
sustainable agriculture. I label this effect as the "perpetuity
syndrome."
6. See B. James Deaton, Jamie Baxter & Carolyn S. Bratt, Examining the Consequences and Characterof 'Heir Property,'68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2344 (2009); see also
B. James Deaton, Land "in Heir": Building a Hypothesis Concerning Tenancy in
Common and the Persistenceof Poverty in Central Appalachia, 11 J. APPALACHIAN
STUD. 83 (2005); B. James Deaton, Intestate Succession and Heirs Property: Implications for Future Research for the Persistenceof Poverty in Central Appalachia, 41 J.
ECON. ISSUEs 927 (2007).
7. Michael A. Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623 (1998).
8. Id. at 623-24.
9. Id. at 624.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Part II of this Article introduces and defines "land tenure" and
"sustainable agriculture" and begins to relate these terms to leasing,
heirs property, and conservation easements. Part III discusses leasing
and the impact of leasing on land tenure and sustainable agriculture.
Heirs property forms the focus of the discussion in Part IV. Tenancy in
common and the tragedy of the anti-commons connect heirs property
to land tenure and sustainable agriculture, so those concepts are explained in that Part. Part V addresses conservation easements and the
complexities inherent in these conveyances. The rigidity of the conservation easement provisions and the difficulty in changing the provisions are related, as these issues impact land tenure and the adoption
of sustainable agricultural practices. Finally, Part VI briefly outlines
policies that could mitigate the effects of leasing, heirs property, and
conservation easements on sustainable agriculture.
II.

IMPACT OF LAND TENURE ON SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE

The Food and Agriculture Organization defines land tenure as "the
relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as
individuals or groups, with respect to land." 1 2 Land tenure defines
rights of "use, control and transfer" of land, "as well as associated
responsibilities and restraints."" "Security of tenure is the certainty
that a person's rights to land will be recognized by others and protected in cases of specific challenges."' 4 Land tenure insecurity increases as the risk of having land rights challenged or lost increases."
Threats of competing claims to rights to the land and threats of dispossession from the land characterize insecure tenure.1 6 Insecure tenure impairs the ability to pursue "sustainable rural livelihoods.""
Many definitions of "sustainable," "sustainability," and "sustainable
agriculture" exist. This Article focuses on sustainable agriculture, so it
limits the attempts at definitions to that term. Stated most simply, the
term "sustainable agriculture" means "developing agricultural practices which protect the environment while preserving the economic
profitability of farmers."" "[I]mportantly, by combining a concern for
the environment with attention to the economics of farming, sustainable agriculture offers a way to harness producers' natural concerns for
12. Food and Agric. Organ. of the United Nations, What is Land Tenure, FAO
3.1 (2002), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4307E/y4307E00
.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3JU-G98K].
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3.31.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Neil D. Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on Ten Years of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIc. L. 423,
425 (1998).
LAND TENURE STUDIEs
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the profitability of their operations."" The Iowa legislature, in establishing the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, defines sustainable agriculture as "the appropriate use of crop and livestock
systems and agricultural inputs supporting those activities which maintain economic and social viability while preserving the high productivity and quality of Iowa's land."2 0
Land tenure affects both environmental and economic aspects of a
farm operation. 2 1 Research consistently shows a connection between
the security of land tenure and sustainable agriculture, in the sense of
willingness to use conservation practices that provide long-term (and
perhaps even short-term or medium-term) environmental benefits. 2 2

Cash renters are less likely than owners to use conservation tillage,
but share renters and owners are equally as likely to use conservation
tillage. 23 Cash renters and share renters are both less likely than owners to use conservation practices that benefit only in the long term
(grassed waterways, stripcropping, and contour farming). 2 4 Cash renters pay cash rent and retain all products of the operation. By contrast,
share renters pay no cash rent, but instead the products of the operation are split between the landlord and the tenant in predetermined
proportions. The difference between the two types of renters with respect to conservation tillage remains unexplained.
A British Columbia study confirmed that owners planted more perennial crops than lessees. 2 5 The perennial crops at issue yield little
immediate benefit but form part of a long-term sustainable crop rotation that contributes to soil conservation. 26 However, the results
showed that various lengths of leases yielded few differences in
behavior.2 7
Land tenure also impacts sustainable agriculture's economic profitability aspect. In contrast to the environmental impacts of land tenure,
little research exists that directly examines the connection between
farm profitability and land tenure, at least in the United States. However, insecure land tenure discourages or prevents investment in the
operation and thereby limits profitability. Conservation easements
19. Id.
20. IowA CODE ANN. § 266.39 (2012).
21. Katie Hannon Michel, Landless: Legal & Policy Tools for Transferring Vermont Farmlandto the Next Generation of Stewards and Food Producers, 39 VT. L.
REV. 461, 473 (2014) (citing ANNETTE M. HIGBY ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE
BUSINESS OF FARMING IN VERMONT 67 (Miranda Smith ed., 2006), http://www.uvm
.edu/farmtransfer/?Page=1egalguide.html [https://perma.cc/CZS4-D8AH]).
22. Id.
23. Soule et al., Land Tenure, supra note 1.
24. Id.
25. Evan D.G. Fraser, Land Tenure and AgriculturalManagement: Soil Conservation on Rented and Owned Fields in Southwest British Columbia, 21 AGRIC. & HUM.
VALUES 73 (2004).
26. Id. at 76.
27. Id. at 77.
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and heirs property impact economic profitability most clearly, but
leasing also affects profitability.
III. LEASING
"[If] the American farm owner's conservation relationship to his
farm is weak, it is practically non-existent in the case of tenants." 28
A.

Introduction

Over 38% of farmland in the United States is leased.2 9 Leased agricultural land raises sustainability concerns due to the lack of incentives by the renter to invest in long-term measures to enrich the soil
and otherwise improve the property.o In addition, trends relating to
the lease terms and the relationship of the landlord to the land and the
tenant exacerbate these concerns. 31
The Census of Agriculture also classifies operators of farmland with
respect to whether the operator farms on owned land, rented land, or
both. "Full owners" farm only land they own and rent no land. 32 "Part
owners" farm land they own as well as land rented from others.3 1 "Tenants" only farm land rented from others or worked on shares for
others.3 4
Approximately 68% of farm operators are full owners." Twentyfive percent of operators farmed land owned by the operator, as well
as land rented from others. Finally, 7% of farm operators work only
land rented from others.
When one examines the acreage farmed by the different categories
of operators, a different picture emerges. Full owners controlled only
36.8% of total farmland acres operated, indicating that full owners
constitute relatively small farms. Part owners farmed 53.7% of total
farm acres 39 , over double the proportionate share indicated by operator numbers. Finally, tenants farmed 9.5% of total farm acres. However, the number and percentage of tenant operators, and acres under
28. ROBERT PARSONS ET AL., THE FARMLASTS PROJECT: FARM LAND ACCESS,
SUCCESSION, TENURE, AND STEWARDSHIP 48 (2010) (quoting R.T. ELY & G.S.
WEHRWEIN, LAND ECONOMICS (1940)), http://www.uvm.edu/farmiasts/FarmLASTS

ResearchReport.pdf [https://perma.ccNJ35-B548].
29. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICAL SERV., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 18 (2014),
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/FullReport/Volume_1,_Chapter 1
US/usvl.pdf [https://perma.cclR7R5-V2MR].
30. Cox, supra note 1, at 370-71.
31. Id.
32. 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 29, at B-9.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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control of tenants, increased between 2007 and 2012-the only category to do so.40
Farm size and region both play a role in the likelihood of leasing
land.4 1 Small Northeastern operators tend to rent land, as do large
farms in the Midwest and the Plains.4 2
Farm operators generally operated owned land until the 1950's,
when farmers started to become renters.4 3 Some commentators assert
that part owners are becoming the norm while others maintain that
the proportion of leased land is decreasing."
B.

Leases and Sustainable Agriculture

"A tenant does not put forth his best efforts when he feels the insecurity that accompanies ownership by persons who not only may be
remote from the locality but may have limited interest in the farm
and the farm family and may not be well informed on agricultural
matters." 45

Leasing offers numerous benefits to farmland owners and to renters. In particular, the availability of land to lease may provide opportunities for beginning farmers to enter the market. 46 However, the
tenant's confidence in the landlord's commitment to continue the
lease greatly affects the uncertainty tenants perceive with respect to
farm leases. 4 7 The factors impacting this confidence, or lack thereof,
include the distance between the landlord's home and the leased
property, the owner's connection to agriculture, and the social relationship between the landlord and tenant. 48 Although some trends are
uncertain, one clear trend emerges-landlords are less likely to live
close to the rented land, and consequently the rate of absentee landlords is increasing. Most landlords still live within 25 miles of the farm
operation. 4 9 However, in Iowa, for example, only 6% of farm land40. Id.

41. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 12 (citing H. Frederick Gale, Age-Specific
Patterns of Exit and Entry in U.S. Farming, 1978-1997, 25 REV. AGRIc. ECON. 168
(2003)).

42. Id.
43. Id. (citation omitted).

44. Id. (citation omitted).
45. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 13 (quoting Improving Farm Tenure in the
Midwest, COMMITTEE ON LAND-TENURE RES. BULL. 502, June 1944, at 151).
46. Katie Hannon Michel, supra note 21, at 474 (citing VT. SUSTAINABLE JOBS
FUND, Analysis of Vermont's Food System, in FARM TO PLATE STRATEGIC PLAN

147-48, 153 (2013), http://www.vtfarmtoplate.com/assets/plan-sections/files/3.2_Farm
%201nputsMAY%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUZ3-76SN]).
47. IOWA STATE, supra note 1, at 10-11.
48. Id. at 10-12.
49. U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS IX-3 (Nat'l Agricultural
Statistics Service, 1999); U.S. Dep't. of Agric., Acres Owned and Rented, Value of
Land and Buildings Rented to Others, and Percent with Debt for All Landlords by
Landlord Characteristics,1997 CENSUS AGRIC. (1999), http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/
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lords in Iowa lived out-of-state at least part time in 1982.50 By 2007,
the rate had increased to 21%.11 These trends also indicate that the
landlord's involvement in making decisions on the property will likely
decrease as well.5 2
Another factor impacting tenure insecurity amongst renters involve
the term, or length, of the lease. Most farm leases consist of shortterm, often year-to-year, oral agreements. 53 An Iowa study reveals
that 1/3 of the farm leases in that state were oral leases.54 Another
Iowa study indicates an even more disturbing situation, with only 19%
of farm leases in that state setting a fixed term." By default, the remaining 81% of leases amount to year-to-year terms. Short-term
leases increase uncertainty for the renter.5 6 The renter is unlikely to
make long-term investments in the land, and banks generally will not
extend credit.5 1 Short-term lessees also are less likely to engage in sustainable practices.
Short-term leases present obstacles to enrollment in government
programs encouraging sustainable practices as well.59 Long-term programs, like the Conservation Reserve Program, require that the applicant be in control of the property for the duration of the program.6 0
Conservation Reserve Program contracts, for example, range in
length from ten to fifteen years.61 Without the involvement of the
landlord, this requirement likely prevents tenants from participating.6 2
Given the lack of incentive for short-term lessees to invest in the
property, fewer sustainable practices will likely result.
The tenancy hypothesis posits that tenants have little incentive to
engage in long-term conservation practices since the tenant has no
Publications/1997/AgriculturalEconomics-andLandOwnership/tbIO4.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/N8WA-UFJW].
50. MICHAEL DUFFY ET AL., FARMLAND OWNERSHIP AND TENURE IN IOWA 2007
(2009).
51. Id.
52. See Cox, supra note 1, at 382-83.
53. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 13; Margaret Rosso Grossman, Leasehold
Interests and the Separation of Ownership and Control in U.S. Farmland,in PROPERTY
AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES To PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 119, 127-28
(Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000).
54. DUFFY ET AL., supra note 50.
55. Michael Duffy et at., Survey of Iowa Leasing Practices, 2007, AG DECISION
MAKER, Oct. 2008, at 2, http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Publications[FM1811.pdf
fhttps://perma.cc/KG48-GYFB].
56. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 13.
57. Id. at 13-14.
58. See Higby, supra note 21; Soule et al., Land Tenure, supra note 1, at 993-1005.
59. See Cox, supra note 1, at 387.
60. Id. at 386.
61. Conservation Reserve Program,U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC. FARM SERV. AGENCY,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/conservationreserve-program/index [https://perma.cc/46G6-7FTE].
62. Id.
63. Id. at 383.

20161 LAND TENURE & SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE

807

stake in the farm past the term of the lease.6 Owner-operators of soybean and corn operations are more likely to use medium-term conservation practices than tenants, and the use of conservation tillage as a
short-term residue management is affected by the type of leasing arrangement. 65 Lessees in British Columbia used "less sustainable" crop
rotations than owners.' Insecurity of tenure negatively relates to sustainable agricultural practices.
To increase certainty and security in farm leases, several issues
should be addressed. The term of the lease clearly provides an important indicator of security and certainty.68 While many farm leases actually remain in effect for many years, year-to-year leases subject to
renewal or cancellation annually fail to promote tenant security and
certainty.6 9 However, the desire of the tenant to receive very early
notice of termination must be balanced with the landlord's desire to
adjust the lease terms in response to changing circumstances at least
annually.7 0
Cash rents discourage long-term leases because cash rents are not
adjusted yearly." To address this issue, an index may be used to adjust
the rent-a-crop share or flexible cash lease can be adopted. 72 A flexible cash lease bases the rent on the crop yield, the market price for the
products raised, or both.7 3
The ability to sell the farm during the lease term also inhibits longterm leases.74 A lease provision that terminates the lease upon sale,
while providing for payment to the tenant in such case, addresses this
issue. 5 However, such a provision also reduces certainty and security
for the tenant.
Landowners may balk at entering into a lease with an unfamiliar
tenant, 6 but default provisions within the lease can address these concerns.7 7 These provisions should not reduce certainty and security for
the tenant, so long as the tenant feels confident that the lease requirements can be met.
64. Lichtenberg, supra note 2, at 294-307.
65. Soule et al., Land Tenure, supra note 1.
66. Fraser, supra note 25.
67. Carolan, supra note 1.
68. Edward Cox, A Lease-Based Approach to Sustainable Farming, Part II: Farm
Tenancy Trends and the Outlook for Sustainability on Rented Lands, 16 DRAKE J.
AGRic. L. 5, 13 (2011).
69. Id. at 19.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 14.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Tenants under short-term leases possess little or no incentive to
make long-term improvements to the property, including enriching
the soil or building structures or infrastructure, as these improvements
belong to the landlord upon termination of the lease." Lease provisions that provide that the landlord and tenant share the costs of such
improvements increase the opportunities to make such long-term
improvements."
Cost-sharing provisions in the lease agreement also may give incentives for the tenant to use sustainable practices.so Leases that provide
that landlords and tenants share risk also increase the security and
certainty of the tenant." Crop-share leases and flexible leases both
accomplish this risk sharing." Note, however, that lease agreements
that provide for risk sharing, cost-sharing, and/or profit sharing must
be carefully drafted to avoid characterizing the relationship as a partnership. Partners in a partnership are personally liable for any debts
or liabilities incurred by other partners in the scope of the business.

IV.

HEIRS PROPERTY

A.

Introduction

The terms "heirs property," "heirs' property," and "land in heirs"
all describe a form of ownership where at least some of the owners
have acquired the property through inheritance.8 3 Often numerous
and related owners hold the property as tenants in common." Heirs
property proves particularly prevalent in poor African American and
Native American communities, 8 5 as well as low-income areas of
Appalachia."
Two concerns arise from heirs property: the vulnerability (or displacement) concern and the wealth (or efficiency) concern.8 7 The vulnerability concern refers to the fear of being forcibly dispossessed
from the property through a partition sale initiated by another coten78. Id. at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 22.
81. Id. at 23.
82. Id.
83. Deaton, supra note 5, at 615-16.
84. Id.
85. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2344-45 (citing Thomas W. Mitchell,
From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:Undermining Black Landownership, Political
Independence, and Community Through PartitionSales of Tenancies in Common, 95
N.W. L. REV. 505 (2001); J. F. Dyer, Heir Property: Legal and Cultural Dimensions of
Collective Landownership, ALA. AGR. Exp. STA. BULL. (2007), https://aurora.auburn.edu/bitstream/handle/11200/4107/BULLO667.pdf?sequence=1 [https://per
ma.cclN8LB-FQ6B]; J.A. Shoemaker, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 Wisc. L. REV. 733).
86. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2345 (citing Deaton, Land in Heir's,
supra note 6; Deaton, Intestate Succession and Heirs Property, supra note 6).
87. Id.; see also Deaton, supra note 5.
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ant, whether a family member or third party." "[I]t is often the case
that an unscrupulous real estate speculator purchases a very small interest in a family-owned tenancy-in-common property with the sole
purpose of seeking a court-ordered partition by sale."" Note that this
concern relates directly to insecure tenure.
The "wealth concern" refers to the diminished ability of cotenants
to use the land-whether to build a home, for recreation, for business,
as collateral for a loan, or other reasons-due to the nature of tenancy
in common.' Many uses of heirs' property, like timbering or mineral
mining, require the unanimous consent of all tenants." This concern
directly relates to the second prong of sustainable agriculture, an economically viable operation.
Included in the wealth concern is the fact that co-tenants of heirs
property find it difficult or impossible to borrow money against the
property or lease the property. 92 Further, "heirs property owners are
not able to bid competitively at the partition sale auction because they
are unable to secure any financing to make an effective bid and because they are cash poor." 93 Heirs property often coincides with land
loss in rural communities.9 4
B.

Tenancy in Common

Tenancy in common involves joint ownership of property where
each of the co-owners holds an undivided fractional interest in the
property.95 The shares of each co-owner need not be equal." Each coowner holds the right to occupy the entire property, in common with
the other co-owners." In other words, the co-owners possess separate
freeholds but undivided possession." The single unity of possession
characterizes tenancy in common. 99
The share of a deceased co-owner generally passes to that coowner's heirs." If the shares of each co-owner are equal, survivorship
88. Deaton, supra note 5, at 617; Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2345.
89.

UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY

OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS

Act 2, Prefatory Note

(NAT'L CONF.

2010). Little or no empirical evidence exists to

either confirm or disprove these claims.
90. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2346.
91. Id.; PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 16.
92. Manuel Baucells & Steven A. Lippman, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A
Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-Up in Co-Ownership, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1191, 1194 (2001); Deaton, supra note 5, at 620-21.
93. UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY AcT 8, Prefatory Note (NAT'L CONF.
OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE LAws 2010).
94. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 16.

95. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2344.
96. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 32 (2016).
97. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6; 20 AM. JUR. 2 D Cotenancy and Joint
Ownership § 31 (2016).
98. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 31 (2016).
99. Id. § 32.
100. See id. § 31.
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may attach if clearly expressed.1 0 A co-owner may transfer his interest in the property, which does not destroy the tenancy, but merely
transfers the interest to a new co-owner. 10 2
Any co-owner may take possession of the entire property, but not
to the exclusion of the other co-owners.' 0 3 Any co-owner of the property also holds the right to request partition of the property or a division of the property among the co-owners.' 04
Any and all co-owners have the right to occupy and utilize the entire property but cannot exclude other co-owners from exercising the
same right.' 0 5 No co-owner may, however, appropriate any portion of
the property for their exclusive use.'
With respect to timber, for example, any co-owner may timber the
property in a customary manner.10 7 However, if the timbering exceeds
the co-owner's proportionate share, other co-owners may file a petition for waste.' 08 All co-owners must consent to a timbering of the
property as a whole.'
C.

Heirs Property and Sustainable Agriculture

The effect of this inability of any of the cotenants to use the land
without the agreement of the other cotenants is an instance of what
has been termed the tragedy of the anti-commons.o The tragedy of
the anti-commons results in the under-utilization of the resources, or
"twaste.""'

The prefatory note to the Uniform Act discusses owners of heirs
property in Maine that are
unable to manage their property in a rational way because some
passive or uncooperative cotenants either do not contribute their
share of the expenses needed to maintain ownership of the property
or refuse to give their needed consent to plans that their more active fellow cotenants formulate to improve the management, stability, and utilization of the property."
101. Id.
102. Id. § 39.
103. Id. § 40.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 41.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 43.
108. Id. §§ 43-44.
109. See id. § 43.
110. Heller, supra note 7; see also Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2347
(citing J. Buchanan & Y.J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons,
43 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (2000); Deaton, supra note 5, at 927-28).
111. Heller, supra note 7, at 626.
112. UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY Acr 7, Prefatory Note (NAT'L CONF.
OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
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[AIll across the country [owners of heirs property] find themselves
locked into a dysfunctional common ownership arrangement because there are no legal mechanisms to consolidate title to such
property among family members who have been active and responsible owners."
In the familiar tragedy of the commons, multiple owners each hold
the right of inclusion, or the right to use the property.' 1 4 This property
regime often leads to overuse of the property. 1 5 By contrast, in the
tragedy of the anti-commons, multiple owners are each endowed with
the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, resulting in a situation where no one owner holds an effective privilege of use." 6 When
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is
prone to underuse-a tragedy of the anti-commons."'7 Heirs property
often lays unused, with no heir able to muster a consensus on how to
use the property. After a time of neglect, adapting the property for
reuse may take significant time and resources. Land and buildings unused in productive activity and allowed to lay neglected for long periods of time "often require a significant investment of labor and money
to bring back into productive and profitable use.""' The fact that resources cannot be leveraged to invest further constrains economic
development." 9
The tragedy of the anti-commons proves especially harmful with respect to "working lands," like agricultural and forestal lands. No
owner can effectively exercise control over the property, so the land
cannot be profitably farmed or timbered. Likewise, no owner will be
willing to lime the soil, repair fences, or make other investments towards sustainable agriculture. The property sits idle, growing up in
weeds.
V.

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

A.

Introduction

The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines "conservation
easement" as:
a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining
113. Id.
114. Heller, supra note 7, at 677.
115. Id.

116. Id. at 668.
117. Id. at 674-77; Deaton, supra note 5.
118. HIGBY ET AL., supra note 21, at 73.
119. Deaton, Intestate Succession and Heir Property, supra note 6, at 929-29.
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or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.1 20
A conservation easement protects conservation values on a particular

property

by placing

restrictions

on the

development

of the

'

property.' 2
The Internal Revenue Code provides a federal income tax deduction for the donation of conservation easements.1 2 2 A "qualified conservation contribution" involves a contribution of a "qualified real

property interest" to a "qualified organization" "exclusively for conservation purposes." 2 3 A qualified real property interest includes "a
restriction (granted in perpetuityl 24 ) on the use which can be made of

the real property."1

25

Qualified organizations include charitable orga-

nizations and government agencies. 12 6
The "exclusively for conservation purposes" requirement entails
perpetual restrictions.1 27 In addition, no surface mining may be conducted. 12 8 When mineral interests have been severed from surface

ownership, the "probability of surface mining occurring . .. [must be]
so remote as to be negligible" to qualify the contribution for federal
income tax benefits.1 2 9
In addition, the perpetuity requirement is not met where "any
method of mining that is inconsistent with the particular conservation
purposes of contribution is permitted at any time."' The deduction is
allowed, however, where the mining may have "limited, localized impact on the real property . . . that are not irremediably destructive of
significant conservation interests.""' The regulations give little guidance on this topic and fail to define the key terms. The only guidance
offered states that if the "production facilities are concealed or compatible with the existing topography and landscape" and the surface is
restored to its prior state, the deduction is allowed. 3 2 Thus, in addi120. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT Acr § 1(1) (amended 2007), http://www.uni
formlaws.org/shared/docs/conservation-easement/uceafinal_81%20with%2007am
ends.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FN2-E96G].
121. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK

14 (2d ed. 2005).

122. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2012).
123. § 170(h)(1).
124. The rule against perpetuities does not apply to conservation easements because the interest involved is not a contingent interest, and because the holder of the
conservation easement must be a charitable organization. Theodore S. Sims, Qualified
Conservation Restrictions: Recollections of and Reflections on the Origins of Section
170(h), 2013 UTAH L. REV. 727, 750.

125. § 170(h)(2)(C).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

§ 170(h)(3).
§ 170(h)(5)(A).
§ 170(h)(5)(B)(i).
§ 170(h)(5)(B)(ii).
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4) (2014).
Id.
Id.
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tion to inadequately informing agricultural landowners as to the allowable scope of agricultural activities, which is one focus of this
Article, the conservation easement provisions fail to give adequate
guidance on the scope of energy extraction activities that are
allowable.1 3 1
The provisions categorize conservation purposes as outdoor recreation by, or education of, the general public1 34 ; protection of ecosystems

and

habitats13 5 ; open

space

preservation13 6 ;

and

historic

13

preservation. ' The rules include farmland and forestland under the
category of "open space. "138 Most farmland conservation easements,
consequently, use the open space rules to qualify for the federal income tax benefits.13 9

To meet the conservation-purpose requirement, open space preservation must be (1) pursuant to a clearly delineated governmental policy or be "for the scenic enjoyment of the general public" 4 0 ; and (2)
"yield a significant public benefit.""' The regulation provides that
preserving farmland pursuant to a flood prevention and control policy
illustrates the preservation of qualifying open space pursuant to a governmental policy and provides a public benefit.14 2
The conservation purposes examples laid out in the regulations include one focused on farmland. Example 5 involves a state statute that
authorizes the purchase of "agricultural land development rights" to
protect a loss of open space appropriate for agriculture.' 4 3 The donation of a conservation easement that prohibits or limits non-agricultural buildings and dwellings not used by the farm operator or
employees qualifies for the federal tax benefits. 1" Neither "agriculture" nor "farmland" is defined in the code or regulations addressing
conservation easements.
B.

Conservation Easements and Land Tenure

Given the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations, conservation easements on agricultural land must advance two
often-conflicting purposes-to prevent development on the property
133. See, e.g., Michael T. Fulks, Drilling and Deductions: Making the Section 170(h)
Conservation Easement Work in the Shale Boom Era, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1053, 1057
(2014).
134. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i).
135. § 170(h)(4)(A)(ii).
136. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii).
137. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv).
138. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii).
139. Paige Madeline Gentry, Note, Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine to Farmland Conservation Easements, 62 DUKE L. J. 1387, 1395 (201).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(i)(B) (2014).
141. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(i).
142. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv)(B).
143. § 1.170A-14(f) (example 5).
144. Id.
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and to promote productive agriculture.14 5 The "exclusively for conservation purposes" requirement must be considered when looking at activities on the farm. The regulations provide that the deduction will
not be allowed if an inconsistent use contravenes a "significant conservation interest[ ]," even where the conservation easements promotes
other significant conservation interests.14 6 The example used in the
regulations explains that if a conservation easement on farmland promotes flood prevention and control, the deduction will nonetheless be
denied if the use of pesticides on the farm destroys a significant
ecosystem. 1 4 7
For the agricultural land owner, the lack of guidance on this point
makes decision making difficult, if not impossible. As the cases described below detail, so-called "agricultural conservation easements,"
as a practical matter, present two often conflicting purposes. First, the
easement promotes agricultural operations on the property. Second,
and most important for the federal income tax deduction, the easement promotes some qualified conservation purpose, often "open
space." Increasingly, courts have had to decide which purpose prevails
when the purposes conflict.
In practice, this conflict most often occurs where the farm operator
wishes to engage in an agritourism activity, place wind turbines or solar panels on the property, or engage in processing or sales activities.
One commentator, referring to these activities as "rural enterprises,"
notes two approaches to deal with these activities. 1 4 8 One approach
allows these activities so long as the enterprise is subordinate to the
farm business, while the other approach allows the activities within
the area set aside in the easement for farm buildings.14 9
The Virginia Outdoors Foundation's Working Farmland/Intensive
Agriculture Variant Conservation Easement Template illustrates another approach, which combines and builds upon both of the ap5 0 The template sets out activities allowed
proaches just discussed.o
in
the "farmstead" (farm building area), allowing certain dwellings and
farm structures, processing and sale of products "produced or partially
produced" "on the property," and alternative energy structures
"scaled to provide electrical energy or pump water for permitted
dwellings, structures, and activities on the property."1 5 1 "[E]xcess
145.
146.
147.
148.

Gentry, supra note 139, at 1390, 1396.
§ 1.170A-14(e)(2).
Id.
Judy Anderson & Jerry Cosgrove, Agricultural Easements: Allowing a Work-

ing Landscape to Work,

EXCHANGE,

1998, at 11-12.

149. Id.

150. VOF Standard Template,

VA. OUTDOORS FOUND.

(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www

.virginiaoutdoorsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/201110_FARMTEM
PLATE.doc [https://perma.cc/8GRH-YGYT].
151. Id. § (1I)(3)(i).
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power generated incidentally" by the alternative energy structures. 15 2
Other miscellaneous buildings and structures are also allowed in the
farmstead area so long as the structures are consistent with the conservation purposes and associated with allowed activities.
A portion of Paragraph 4 of the easement, setting out allowable
activities outside the farmstead area, states:
(i) Activities outside the Farmstead Area. Industrial or commercial
activities outside the Farmstead Area are prohibited, with the exception of the following:
(a) agriculture (including livestock production), equine activities, or forestry;
(b) processing or sale of farm or forest products produced or
partially produced on the Property in buildings permitted in Section
II Paragraph 3(i)(c) and 3 (ii)(c) above;
(c) small-scale incidental commercial or industrial operations
compatible with activities set forth in (a) above that Grantee approves in writing as being consistent with the conservation purpose
of this Easement;
(d) activities that can be and in fact are conducted within permitted buildings without material alteration to their external
appearance.
(e) the sale of excess power generated incidentally in the operation of approved alternative energy structures and associated equipment or other energy structures approved by Grantee, as provided
in Section II Paragraph 3 (ii)(f) above. 3
Paragraph 3(ii) addresses buildings and structures outside of the farmstead area. Notably, buildings for processing of products (produced or
partially produced on the property) and alternative energy structures
(to provide energy or water for permitted dwellings and activities) are
further limited, with square footage limitations for procession
buildings.' 54
Three published court opinions illustrate the tension between agricultural production and conservation with respect to agricultural conservation easements. First, a Kentucky case required the court to
resolve conflicting conservation easement provisions-one that allows
commercial agriculture and another that prohibits ditching, draining,
or filling on the property.' The Simses purchased the subject property from The Nature Conservancy subject to a conservation easement. Section 1 of the easement provides that "the purpose of th[e]
Easement [is] to assure that the Protected Property will be retained
forever substantially undisturbed in its natural condition and to prevent any use .
152.
153.
154.
155.

.

. that will significantly impair or interfere with the

Id. § (II)(3)(i)(d).
Id. § (II)(4)(i).
Id. § (II)(3)(ii)(c)-(d).
Nature Conservancy, Inc. v. Sims, 680 F.3d 672 (2012).
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Conservation Values of the Protected Property.""' 6 However, Paragraph 2.5 of the easement prohibited "ditching; draining; diking; filling; excavating; removal of topsoil, sand, gravel, rock or other
materials; or any change in the topography of the land in any manner
except in conjunction with activities otherwise specifically authorized
herein." 15 In 2005, The Nature Conservancy inspected the property
and alleged that several violations had occurred, including the filling
of a sinkhole on the property.'15 Sims alleged that the sinkhole had
been filled to facilitate agricultural production on the property.' 5 9 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
granted summary judgment to The Nature Conservancy, reasoning
that, although the easement allowed agricultural activities like plowing, the prohibition against alteration of the topography prohibited
the filling of the sinkhole.' The court also granted The Nature Conservancy attorneys' fees of over $80,000 and costs of over $18,000.6'
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Sims argued that Section 3.2 of the conservation easement, which
permits "commercial agricultur[e]" on a portion of the property, in
conjunction with Section 2.5, which prohibits altering the topography
of the property "except in conjunction with activities otherwise specifically authorized herein," allowed them to fill the sinkhole "to create
more land for farming. "162
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the reasoning of the district court, which
interpreted the easement as allowing "minor alterations . . . such as
plowing, to allow for 'growing crops, raising and selling native plants
and their seeds, grazing livestock, cutting, bailing and removing hay,'
but not "extensive regrading of the sinkhole."1 63 The court referred to
the former as "a normal precursor to farming activities," and the latter
as advancing "the sole purpose of making farming easier.""64 Further,
the court reasoned that "some loss in the agricultural value of the land
was . . . likely anticipated by the parties." 16 5
Second, a Maryland case' 6 6 involved a citizen challenge to whether
a conservation easement permitted a creamery that would market lo156. Id. at 674 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
157. Id. at 676.
158. Id. at 674.
159. Id. at 676.
160. Id. at 675.
161. Id. at 675-76.
162. Id. at 676 (alterations in original).
163. Id. at 676-77.
164. Id. at 677.
165. Id.
166. Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 68 A.3d 843, 843 (Md.
2013). Note that the citizens group filed a second lawsuit, Long Green Valley Ass'n v.
Prigel Family Creamery, 47 A.3d 1087 (Md. App. 2012), alleging that the county improperly granted the Prigels a special use permit to operate the creamery. The circuit
court affirmed the local board's granting of the permit, and the Court of Special Ap-
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cally produced organic dairy products to the public. In 1997, Bellevale
sold an "agricultural preservation easement" on the farm to a state
agency.16 7 Approximately ten years later, Bellevale proposed to build
a 10,000 square foot creamery on the property to process raw milk and
sell the products to the general public.i6 8 The proposal also included a
1,500 square foot farm market to sell products to the public as well as
a parking lot.' 6 The operation would employ approximately 14 em70
ployees.o
Bellevale requested approval from the holder of the easement, Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation
("MALPF"), to begin construction on the project. MALPF granted
Bellevale permission to proceed with the project, finding that "the operation was a 'farm related use' that complements the Prigels' organic
dairy operation-a use that is compatible with agriculture and [the]
MALPF's program.""' A community association and adjacent landowners filed suit, alleging that the proposed creamery would violate
the provisions of the easement. 17 2
The easement stated that "the parties [intend] that the said land be
preserved solely for agricultural use . . . ."" The covenants and re-

strictions included the following provisions:
[A](1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this instrument, the
above described land may not be used for any commercial, industrial, or residential purpose ....
[Aj(3) The Grantor reserves the right to use the above described
land for any farm use, and to carry on all normal farming practices
. . . including any operation directly relating to the processing, storage, or sale of farm, agricultural or woodland products produced on
the said above described land .

. ..

The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing.' 7 The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the conservation
easement created a charitable trust; therefore, interested members of
the public may enforce the easement's provisions.' 7 6
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The court reasoned
that "the principal objective of the Bellevale Easement is not charitable, but rather concerned with maintaining agriculture as a profitable
peals of Maryland affirmed. That decision was not appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland.
167. Long Green Valley Ass'n, 68 A.3d at 845.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 845.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 851.
Id.
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endeavor.""' Referring to the language of the easement, which fails
to reference conservation of rural land or the prevention of urban
blight, the court noted the emphasis on allowing the use of the land
"all normal farming practices, including the operation at any time of
any machinery used in farm production or the primary processing of
any agriculturalproducts . . . ."" Examining the statutory provisions
creating and governing MALPF, the court concluded that the program, instead of creating charitable trusts through conservation easements, "is market-oriented and profit-driven, even if some
consequential benefits flow to the general public in Maryland."' 79
Although Bellevale Farms prevailed in this lawsuit, the costs of litigation threatened the continuation of the farm operation. 8 0 Many operations would not have survived this series of lawsuits. The
conservation easement made innovations in the operation uncertain
and costly, even though the operation focused on grass-fed dairy and
organic production, types of production thought to be sustainable.
Finally, a recent Virginia Supreme Court case addressed the tension
between agricultural production and land conservation in the context
of interpreting the provisions of a conservation easement."8 ' In 2001,
Wetlands America Trust, Inc. ("WAT") was the grantee of a conservation easement on farm property.1 8 2 White Cloud Nine Ventures, LP
("White Cloud") later acquired a portion of the land subject to the
easement, which was adjacent to a parcel already owned by White
Cloud.'8
White Cloud commenced construction of a building on the easement property. 1 84 The building would be used for a creamery and
bakery (using milk and wheat raised on the adjacent property), storage of aging wine (produced from grapes grown on both properties),
and a tasting room.' The plans included the sale of wine, cheese, and
177. Id. at 860.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 860. This conclusion is extraordinary and, if adopted by federal courts
with respect to donated conservation easements, would likely mean that donated agricultural easements fail to qualify for the federal income tax deduction under I.R.C.
§ 170. However, this issue lies beyond the scope of this Article. The conclusion highlights, however, the differences between "open space" and "agricultural" conservation easements, and the tension between the federal income tax provisions and
conservation easements on working lands.
180. "The costs of going organic were dwarfed by lawyer fees. Paying lawyer bills
put the grain bill out of reach." Rachel Gilker, Grazing Profitably with a Cherry on
Top, ON PASTURE (Mar. 24, 2014), http://onpasture.com/2014/03/24/grazing-profitably-with-a-cherry-on-top/ [https://perma.cc/Z2LC-YHMT].
181. Wetlands Am. Trust, Inc. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, L.P., 782 S.E.2d 131
(Va. 2016).
182. Id. at 134.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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bakery products produced on the site, and the property would be
open to the public.'"
WAT filed suit for declaratory judgment, claiming that construction
of the building and the intended uses violated the conservation easement.' 8 7 After a five-day trial, the trial court ruled in favor of White
Cloud, with the exception of some rulings on affirmative defenses not
relevant given the ultimate outcome of the case.' WAT appealed,
claiming as error, inter alia, the court's application of the common law
strict construction principle for restrictive covenants to a conservation
easement.' 8 9
Several provisions of the easement appear to conflict with each
other. Section 1.1 sets out the purpose of the easement.
It is the purpose of this Easement to assure that the Protected Property will be retained in perpetuity predominantly in its natural,
scenic, and open condition, as evidenced by the [Baseline Document] Report [BDR], for conservation purposes as well as permitted agricultural pursuits, and to prevent any use of the Protected
Property which will impair significantly or interfere with the conservation values of the Protected Property, its wildlife habitat, natural
resources or associated ecosystem.'
Section 3.3(A)(iv) of the easement states: "No permanent or temporary building or structure shall be built or maintained on the entirety
of the Protected Property other than .

.

. farm buildings or structures

. . . ."191 The easement fails to define either "farm buildings" or "farm
structures." 1 9 2

On the other hand, Section 3.1 of the easement allows
"'[i]ndustrial' and 'commercial' agricultural services." 9 3 Neither "industrial" nor "commercial" is defined. Similarly, the easement fails to
define the term "agricultural services." Additionally, Section 4.1 provides that "changes in agricultural technologies, including accepted
farm and forestry management practices may result in an evolution of
agricultural activities on the Protected Property." 9 4
WAT maintained that Section 1.1 unambiguously acts to prohibit
any significant changes to the property.1 95 "So if you come back to
that property a hundred years from now, . . . it should look almost
exactly like it looked in 2001 . ."6 The Virginia Supreme Court,
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 134-35.

189. Id. at 135.
190. Id. at 146 (internal quotations omitted).
191. Id. at 139 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
192. Id.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 140 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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based on provisions of the easement allowing farm buildings and industrial and commercial activities, rejected WAT's conclusion.19 7 In
doing so, the court acknowledged an "inherent tension between the
'conservation purposes' and the expressly 'permitted agricultural pursuits"' and noted that the easement requires a balance between the
two.1 98

The Virginia Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the common law
strict construction rule applied to the provisions of the easement, affirming the trial court decision." 9 Two justices dissented, maintaining
that common law was abrogated for conservation easements "long
ago," based upon the clearly delineated public policy in the state
favoring land conservation.2 0 0 The divided court further demonstrates
the uncertainty that conservation easements introduce into farm
operations.
The three cases, taken together, illustrate the issues raised by placing conservation easements on agricultural land. Allowing agricultural
practices creates a tension with the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, and often results in ambiguous and conflicting provisions within
the conservation easement. As agricultural practices evolve and market conditions change, the uncertainty caused by conservation easements increases.
Conservation easements may not deliver all that proponents advance. The value of conservation easement properties sometimes increases due to the value as a country estate.2 0 ' Conservation
easements also fail to guarantee that land will remain in agriculture.2 0 2
Conservation easements prevent the development of the property
and limit the economic activities on the property, but cannot ensure
that any particular economic activity continues. Indeed, the limitations in conservation easements likely make the allowed economic activity more difficult to maintain. Changing economic conditions or
family dynamics may make continued agricultural activity impossible
or difficult.2 03 Limiting agritourism activities further increases the
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 143-44.
200. Id. at 144-45 (Roush, J., dissenting).
201. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 28, at 18. The Author was a member of the Virginia Farmland Preservation Task Force. The Task Force created the Virginia
Purchase of Development Rights Program, now housed in the Virginia Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services' Office of Farmland Preservation. The original
document creating the program stated that the PDR program would reduce the value
of property, making the land more affordable for farm operators, particularly beginning farmers. After one year of experience with the program, that statement was removed as fair market values of property encumbered by conservation easements in
the state often remained the same, and sometimes increased.
202. Id.
203. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & L. Leon Geyer, Landowner Considerationsin Selling
Development Rights or Donating Conservation Easements, HORIZONs, Jan.-Feb. 2007.
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chances that continuance of the farm operation may become more difficult in the future. 20
The prohibition or limitation of subdivision of the property further
imperils the future of the farm operation.20 5 If a landowner leaves the
property to his children equally, then the specter of heirs property
looms, while arguably preventing partition-in-kind of the land due to
the subdivision restrictions.' In addition, conflicts between the heirs
may force the sale of the property. Agriculture may change form dramatically in the future, and the conservation easement provisions cannot forecast these possible changes. 20 7 The determinative factor of
whether the land will remain in agriculture continues to be the economic viability of the operation. Conservation easements, by limiting
options, increase the probability that agriculture will become inviable
on the property.
The conservation easement may reduce the value of the property.
Indeed, to obtain the federal tax benefits, reduction of the value of the
property is assumed. 2 0 8 However, this reduction limits the borrowing
power of the operator. 2 0 9 The restriction on subdivision of the property may also raise issues on the farm.
All of these restrictions and requirements limit the choices of farm
operators, even if the operator owns the property. In the ever-changing environment of agriculture, these constrained choices may
threaten the second prong of sustainable agriculture-economic viability of the operation.
C.

Making Changes to Conservation Easements

"Most conservation easements are written to last in perpetuity. Any
change to any conservation easement should be approached with
great caution and careful scrutiny.,

210

In theory, if conditions change and the conservation easement inhibits sustainable agriculture, the conservation easement may be
204. Id.
205. Id. Most conservation easements either prohibit subdivision of the parcel, or
limit the subdivision to a certain number and, often, to a certain geographic area.
Some conservation easements additionally merge multiple parcels into one parcel for
the purposes of the conservation easement.
206. No court has yet considered a partition suit with respect to land subject to a
conservation easement that prohibits subdivision. We do not know whether a court
would feel bound by the provisions of the conservation easement or whether alteration of the provisions by a court would impact the federal income tax deduction. If a
court feels bound or constrained by the provisions, the court would be more likely to
order the sale of the property, and the land would be more likely to be purchased by a
non-family member.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AMENDING CONSERVATION EASEMENTs: EVOLVING
PRACrICES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 9 (2007).
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changed to conform to new conditions. However, in practice, changing
a conservation easement proves to be extremely difficult.2
The Land Trust Alliance ("the Alliance") sets out seven principles
that it believes should guide the amendment of conservation easements.2 12 According to the Alliance's guidelines, amendment policies
should only be as flexible as necessary and amendments to easements
should:
1. Clearly serve the public interest and be consistent with the
holder's mission;
2. Comply with all applicable laws and regulations;
3. Not raise concerns about the holder's tax-exempt or charitable
status;
4. Not result in private inurement or impermissible private benefit;
5. Be consistent with the conservation purpose(s) and intent of the
easement;
6. Be consistent with the intent of the donor or grantor of the easement and any funding agencies; and
7. Have a net beneficial or neutral effect on the relevant conservation values protected by the easement.2 13
The Alliance also urges that the following issues be considered:
* Effect on stewardship and administration of the easement;
* Engagement of stakeholders, other owners or other involved
parties;
* Consideration of conflicts of interest;
* Resolution of title issues;
* Concerns about real property tax issues;
* Acquisition of additional expert advice;
* Supplementation of baseline documentation and related cost;
and
* Completion of required tax forms.2 1 4
The policy also seems to discourage relaxing restrictions on one parcel in exchange for additional or new restrictions on a different parcel. 2 1 5 The report also cites concerns about such bargains violating
applicable law and lack of court review.2 1 6 For example, IRS regulations provide that the original deduction taken by the donor remains
unaffected so long as the termination results from an "unexpected
change" that "make[s] impossible or impractical the continued use of
the property for conservation purposes . . . ."217 The termination must
211. See, e.g., Gentry, supra note 139, at 1390-91, 1396 (describing the IRS regulatory barriers to making changes to conservation easements that received federal tax
benefits).
212. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 210, at 17.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 18.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (2007).
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occur in a judicial proceeding, and the portion of the funds resulting
from any subsequent sale or disposition of the property must be allocated to the holder of the easement and must be used in a manner that
as closely as possible conforms to the conservation purpose of the
original conservation easement. 2 18
The guidance recommends a written amendment policy to facilitate
application of the these principles.2 1 9 The policy should consider the
relevant tax provisions, including private inurement and private benefit prohibitions, state conservation easement enabling statutes, and
state law governing charitable organizations. 220
These difficulties in adapting conservation easements to changing
conditions create what the Author deems the "perpetuity syndrome."
Rules are included in a document that likely will not change, locking
the landowner into particular forms and agriculture, limiting choices,
and stifling innovation. Whether certain activities are permitted must
be subjected to a case-by-case analysis under Internal Revenue rules,
creating uncertainty and destabilizing land tenure.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Part presents several possible policy options to mitigate the
negative impacts of uncertain land tenure (land tenure insecurity) created by leases, heirs property, and conservation easements. Some of
these policies have been applied to leases, but few look beyond leaseholds to find analogous situations where these policies or similar policies may encourage sustainable agriculture.
A. Policies for Leases
1. Long-term leases encourage sustainable practices and improve
the willingness of financial institutions to provide credit, allowing
investment in the property. 22 1 Most leases are oral, year-to-year,
handshake agreements. In a year-to-year lease, the tenant holds
no incentive to invest in sustainable agricultural practices unless
a practice pays off within the one-year period. The uncertainty of
year-to-year and other short-term leases leads to the impermanence syndrome.
2. Iowa and Nebraska offer a tax credit to landowners who rent
farmland or farm assets.2 22 These provisions could require a
long-term lease to obtain the benefits.
3. Provide for cost-sharing for conservation practices in leases.2 2 3
Cost-sharing involves the tenant and the landlord each paying a
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,

supra note 210, at 21.

Id. at 23-32.
PARSONS ET AL.,

Id. at 24.
Id. at 53.

supra note 28, at 19-20.
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4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

9.
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portion of the costs of sustainable agricultural practices. A longterm lease facilitates cost-sharing agreements since the tenant
will not invest money and time unless the investment will be returned within the lease period.
Require a long-term lease to qualify for certain benefits. For example, New York requires a five-year lease to qualify for usevalue assessment if the land is leased.2 2 4
Government program benefits tied to long-term leases. Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP") and other benefits could require a long-term lease if a tenant farms the property. For
example, the Transition Incentives Program ("TIP") gives an additional two years of CRP payments to retired farm operators if
their tenant farms under a non-revocable lease of five years or
longer.2 25
Require the use of sustainable agricultural practices for government benefits. For example, the TIP program also requires the
use of sustainable farming practices and that the landowner allow the tenant to develop a conservation plan, make conservation improvements, and apply for organic certification.2 2 6
Provide incentives for private contract solutions within written
leases.2 27
Provide for long-term (ninety-nine year) land leases for agriculture, with the tenant building the structures at his own expense.
This situation simulates ownership for the tenant and provides a
long term over which the tenant may control the property, encouraging sustainable agricultural practices.
Use of sustainable lease forms. The Sustainable Agricultural
Land Tenure Initiative at Drake University Agricultural Law
Center has developed a sustainable lease guide. 2 1 The website
explains that a sustainable farm lease is one that is "beneficial to
the landowner, the farmer, the community, and the land."2 29
B.

Policiesfor Heirs Property

1. Provide low-cost or free estate planning advice and document
preparation to rural landowners to prevent the proliferation of
heirs property.23 0
224. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF TAXATION & FIN. OFFICE OF REAL PROP. TAX SERVS.,
Form RP-305-c (2014), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current-forms/orpts/rp305c-fillin
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPC4-TPYD].
225. Conservation Reserve Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1410.64 (2015).
226. Id.; Cox, supra note 1, at 387.
227. Cox, supra note 68, at 12.
228. Ed Cox & Matt Russell, Sustainable Agricultural Land Tenure Initiative,
DRAKE AGRIC. L. CTR. (Jan. 8, 2016), http://sustainablefarmlease.org/the-landowners-guide-to-sustainable-farm-leases/ [http://perma.cc/64VP-QG7Y].
229. Id.
230. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2352.
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2. Partition suits provide a form of relief for heirs property. 2 3 1
Note, however, that much controversy exists with respect to the
partition of heirs property,23 2 and that partition in kind may exacerbate the anti-commons nature of the property.2 3 3
3. Provide statutory default rules for heirs property that mimic buyout provisions in partnership and limited liability statutes.
4. Increase information available to heirs by, for example, increased access to and interpretation of property records.2 3 4
5. Use eminent domain to alleviate or minimize heirs property concerns. Eminent domain clears title to the property. In addition,
the property could be distributed to one of the heirs to eliminate
the anti-commons nature of the property. 2 3 5

1.

2.

3.

4.

C. Policiesfor Conservation Easements
Decouple federal income tax policy and land conservation. Today, federal income tax policy controls the donation of conservation easements. No conservation purpose directly addresses
agriculture, so "agricultural conservation easements" must attempt to fit into other categories, most often open space. For example, by using purchase of development rights programs, where
landowners receive cash payments for the sale of development
rights, local governments and nonprofits can target the property
most desired for agricultural conservation instead of attempting
to fit square agricultural lands into Internal Revenue Code
round holes.
Provide equivalent federal income tax benefits for term (less
than perpetual) easements and perpetual easements. Federal income tax policy likewise requires that conservation easements be
perpetual in order to receive federal income tax benefits. Many
agricultural landowners are not willing to donate easements for
perpetuity but may be willing to donate easements for a term of
years.
Require local farmland protection plans for funding of purchase
of development rights ("PDR") programs.
Requiring local
farmland protection plans ensures that local governments will
have a strategy for protecting the most valuable farmland and
makes it more likely that the land will be used for agriculture.
Have written farm transition plan as a factor (or requirement) in
PDR funding. Farm transition refers to passing the farm business

231. Heller, supra note 7, at 624 n.11, 65 n.201.
232. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY Act (NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).

233. Heller, supra note 7, at n.201.
234. Deaton, Baxter & Bratt, supra note 6, at 2352-53.
235. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 299, 243, 245 (1984).
236. North Carolina reduces the local match requirement for counties with a
county-wide farmland Protection Plan. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 106-744 (West 2015).
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to the next generation. Many farm families fail to plan for this
transition, resulting in the cessation of the farm business. Requiring written farm transition plans prior to the purchase of development rights will make it more likely that the farm business will
continue for a long period of time.
5. Require perpetual affordability clauses in agricultural conservation easements. These clauses require that when the land is sold,
that it be sold for farm value. The land trust holds an option to
purchase at agricultural value. These clauses prevent purchasers
from engaging in speculative behavior and selling the land for
estate value, and further ensures that the land value (and
purchase price) will allow the purchaser to continue to engage in
agriculture.23 7
D.

Policies for All Three Situations

The primary policy is always education for the stakeholders on the
issues and possible solutions. Education informs the stakeholders of
the issues and steps that may be taken to minimize or eliminate negative consequences.
237. See, e.g., Vermont Land Trust, Greener Pasturesfor New Farmers, DEL. VALLEY REGIONAL PLAN. COMMISSION (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.dvrpc.org/food/pdf/
GPVermontLandTrust.pdf; MODEL AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT
WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE art. IV, http://equitytrust.org/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2011/09/ModelAgriculturalConservationEasement.pdf
2016).
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